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Fifty years after Miller and Modigliani’s seminal work on corporate financial policy, there is much about a 
company’s payout policy that is still not well understood. Signaling future earnings and income taxes are 
widely believed to be two considerations when the board decides the payout.1 We focus on a third, namely 
the role of dividends and other payouts in resolving agency-based conflict between insiders and outside 
shareholders (Jensen (1986)). All else equal, shareholders prefer the firm to pay out a larger fraction of its 
earnings since a lower retention rate reduces any opportunities for managers to squander money on 
unprofitable projects or to disadvantage outside shareholders in other ways.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny ((2000); hereafter LLSV) establish the importance of 
the quality of shareholder protection2 as a country level proxy for lower agency costs in determining 
dividend payouts. Their results support the outcome model, which is based on the notion that minority 
shareholders in high protection countries can protect their interests by pressuring managers into 
distributing cash. Minority shareholders can do this because they have access to various legal mechanisms 
such as the right to vote on important corporate matters and the right to sue the firm for damages. The 
greater the minority rights, the more cash they can extract from the company, all else equal.3 In this model, 
dividend policy reflects the level of investor protection. 
However, agency costs can differ substantially across firms within any one country. This implies that 
country level measures of shareholder protection, as an indicator of expected agency costs, are limited in 
                                                           
1 See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008), who synthesize a vast amount of research on corporate payout policy grounded 
in the pioneering work of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961). This research has focused on signaling models (e.g. 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), Williams (1988), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), Grullon and Michaely (2002)), agency costs (e.g. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Del 
Guercio (1996), Lie (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Oded (2008)), clientele models and taxes (e.g. Brennan (1970), Elton 
and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), Miller and Scholes (1978), Desai and Jin (2008), Rossi and Laham (2008)), behavioral aspects 
(e.g. Thaler and Shefrin (1981)), payout choice (e.g. Vermaelen (1984), Bagwell (1991), Stulz (1988), Barclay and Smith (1988), 
Brennan and Thakor (1990), Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach(2000)), or other aspects of payout policy (e.g. Grullon, Paye, 
Underwood and Weston (2008), Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2008)). 
2 LLSV use two indicators of shareholder protection. One is based on a country’s legal regime (common law or civil law) and the 
other on whether a country’s index of antidirector rights is above or below the sample median. 
3 The alternative view, which is presented by the substitution model, assumes corporate insiders have an incentive to pay 
dividends to minority shareholders in order to establish a good reputation and thereby reduce the cost of capital in future equity 
issues. Under this view, a negative relationship between shareholder protection and payouts is predicted. 
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the insights they can yield since they do not allow for and thus do not capture variation in agency costs at 
the firm level. We thus test whether differences in firm level agency costs within the same regulatory 
environment also have explanatory power, and how they interact with country level agency costs in 
determining corporate payouts. Our findings have important implications for understanding country versus 
firm level constraints on managers. 
Although both country level and firm level measures of agency conflicts have separately been found 
to matter in corporate payouts, the literature is surprisingly thin on their relative importance. Faccio, Lang 
and Young (2001) report higher dividend payouts in firms with lower agency conflicts, measured by the 
divergence between the controlling shareholder’s ownership rights and its control rights, after accounting 
for country level investor protection. Our study differs from their work in a number of important ways.  
While Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) focus on 5 Western and 9 Eastern countries, our sample 
comprises 43 countries, thus increasing the generality of our findings on corporate payout decisions. 
Further, in light of the increasing use of share repurchases to disburse cash (Fama and French (2001)), all 
our tests include the potentially important role of repurchases in the aggregate corporate payout; LLSV’s 
study is based only on one year, 1994, which had relatively fewer repurchases compared to our much more 
recent and extended sample period (2001-2006).4 More importantly, unlike Faccio, Lang and Young (2001), 
who treat country level investor protection as a control variable, we investigate the interplay between firm 
and country level agency cost measures in relation both to the total payout and to the choice of the form of 
payout (i.e., dividends versus stock repurchases).  
                                                           
4 LLSV acknowledge (p. 5) share repurchases are excluded from their study and briefly discuss possible effects on their results. 
The increasing significance of share repurchases as a form of payout is clearly evident in our time series. For the period up to 
and including 1994, the year on which LLSV’s results are based, the world average (median) of repurchases as a percentage of 
net income (earnings) was 3.69% (0.95%). The proportion increased from 2000 onwards, reaching an average of 6.99% (median 
4.5%) in 2006. Share repurchases averaged about 3% (median 1%) of total payouts in each year up to and including 1994, but 
averaged about 11% (median 9%) in later years. The median proportion of firms engaging in share repurchases increased 
dramatically, from one in 100 in 1994 to almost one in five in 2006. 
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Overall, our findings confirm the generality of the outcome model of corporate payouts. The 
effectiveness of legal measures to protect outside shareholders differs substantially across countries, as 
reported by LLSV, but within a country, agency costs differ across firms as well. Consequently, although 
investors in high protection countries are able to use their legal power to extract cash, either in the form of 
dividends or repurchases, agency conflicts at the firm level hinder their ability to do so. For example, a one 
standard deviation decrease in ownership concentration, a proxy for firm level agency costs, is associated 
with a 2.6% increase in total payouts whereas a one standard deviation increase in ownership 
independence, another proxy for firm level agency costs, is associated with a 1.7% increase in total payouts. 
When the corporate governance score is used to proxy firm level agency costs, a one standard deviation 
increase in the governance score is associated with a 2.1% increase in total payouts. Finally, insider-
dominated firms, proxying higher firm level agency costs, have a 3.6% lower payout than non insider-
dominated firms. In low protection countries, firm level agency conflicts also matter to payouts with some 
evidence of substitutions between country and firm level investor protection.  
A further implication of the outcome model is that firms with higher investment opportunities have 
lower payouts only in countries where investors enjoy adequate protection. The use of firm level data 
allows us to develop a robust test of this argument by including various measures of firm level agency costs 
in a 2×2×2 matrix of high versus low investor protection, high versus low agency costs, and high versus 
low growth opportunities. According to the outcome model, in high protection countries, payouts are 
predicted to decrease as we move from low growth/low agency cost firms to high growth/high agency 
cost firms. In low protection countries, investors are less able to force firms to disgorge an operating cash 
surplus, implying we should observe a lower payout ratio relative to firms in high protection countries, 
irrespective of growth opportunities and other agency costs. 
Our results show high growth firms have significantly lower payouts when agency conflicts at both 
firm and country levels are low. Therefore, in the presence of investment opportunities, investors are 
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willing to defer the receipt of a return on their investment to a later period if they enjoy high protection at 
both the country and firm levels, consistent with the outcome model. As expected, the strength of the 
relationship between payouts and growth opportunities is reduced when agency costs at either the country 
or firm level increase, using ownership independence and insider-dominated firms to proxy firm level 
agency costs. This implies that although some protection, either at the firm or country level, is at least 
partly effective in enabling investors to extract surplus cash in the face of investment opportunities, the 
“best” outcome for corporate payouts occurs when protection is effective at both country and firm levels. 
Evidence of substitutions between country and firm level agency costs in the relationship between payouts 
and growth opportunities is found when we proxy firm level agency costs by ownership concentration and 
governance quality.  
We extend the test of the outcome model to the choice of the form of payout since dividends and 
share repurchases can play different roles in mitigating agency conflicts. Consistent with predictions, 
investors in high protection countries are more able to pressure firms to pay the surplus cash in the 
(preferred) form of committed dividend payments. Agency conflicts at the firm level are also significant in 
explaining corporate choice of the form of payout. Of the firm level agency cost variables investigated, the 
outcome model of payout choice is supported when we proxy agency costs by ownership concentration. In 
countries where investors enjoy greater protection, more closely held (higher agency conflict) firms choose 
the more flexible option of repurchase while less closely held (lower agency conflict) firms choose 
dividends, thereby committing to the payout in the longer term.  
We subject our findings to a battery of tests and find they are robust to several country and firm level 
variable specifications, and when we exclude the country that is the most heavily represented in our 
sample. Industry adjustments are also considered but they do not change the thrust of our conclusions. In 
the spirit of Spamann (2010), we investigate alternative measures of legal investor protection and add the 
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outcome model of corporate payouts to the list of tests that survive the corrections to the widely used 
antidirector rights index. 
Our paper thus contributes to recent developments in international corporate finance research on 
the relative importance of firm and country level variables to key corporate policy outcomes. For example, 
Miller and Reisel (2009) study restrictive covenants attached to public corporate bonds and find that 
investor protection can be derived not only from legal rights provided by countries’ laws but also from 
rights attached to individual securities at the issuer’s discretion. Bruno and Claessens (2007) find a neutral 
or negative interaction effect between country regulatory regimes and firm corporate governance practices 
on firm valuation. Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) conclude firm value is positively related to 
board independence for a sample of firms with a controlling shareholder in poor protection countries. 
Finally, Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) find firms that need external funding adopt 
stronger governance practices than required by law, especially in weak investor protection countries. We 
extend this line of research by documenting the relative importance and the interactive effects of the 
strength of legal investor protection, as a proxy for country level agency conflicts, and firm level agency 
conflicts in determining corporate payout policy.  
An implication of our findings is that the rights of minority shareholders are mostly determined at 
the country level rather than the firm level, consistent with other recent papers. In particular, Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell (2008) report the effects of country level granting and enforcing of shareholder rights 
dominate the effect of variation in the control of firm level agency conflicts; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2007) find that although firm-specific variables are successful in explaining variation in firm level 
corporate governance and disclosure practices, their explanatory power is dwarfed by that of country 
characteristics; and Aggarwal, Esrel, Stulz and Williamson (2007) find evidence that countries in which 
investors are poorly protected have poorer corporate governance as well. 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and research 
method. Section II outlines the sample profile and discusses some univariate results. Results from 
multivariate analysis of cross-sectional differences in the amount of total payouts and the choice of the 
form of payouts (i.e., dividends versus share repurchases) are discussed in Section III. Section IV 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
I. Data and Method 
Our sample is based on Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database. Since share repurchases have become 
increasingly popular over time, we perform our analysis for the period 2001-2006. We eliminate firm-years 
with reportedly negative dividends (Field: 04551) and with non-positive sales (Field: 07240), net income 
(Field: 01751) or operating cash flow (Field: 04201), and financial firms (Field: 04300). Firm-years with 
missing data on dividends, sales, net income or cash flow, and where dividends and net income exceed 
sales, are also excluded. So are countries with less than 30 firm-year observations and with mandatory 
dividend payouts exceeding 25% of net income (Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Greece, Uruguay and 
Venezuela). Our final sample consists of 87,213 firm-year observations covering 29,610 firms in 43 
countries. Appendix I shows the sample coverage by country and year. 
For these firms, we obtain accounting data to compute payout ratios as well as variables describing 
other firm characteristics. Several variables are employed to measure corporate disbursements. We employ 
funds used to decrease outstanding common or preferred stock (Field: 04751) to proxy for share 
repurchases (Allen and Michaely, 2003). Dividend payout is the sum of common and preferred dividends 
(Field: 04551), while total payout is dividends plus share repurchases. To accommodate differences in 
accounting standards across countries and changes over time, the three payout measures (dividends, 
repurchases, and their sum) are scaled either by net income, net cash flow from operations, or net sales. 
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We compute the industry-adjusted measure of sales growth rate (Growth), where the growth rate is 
the average percentage change in the last five years’ annual sales. For each firm in a given industry, we 
make this adjustment relative to the worldwide median for that industry in that year, rather than the 
country-wide median. The adjustment controls for differences in the growth and maturity of each industry. 
To alleviate the impact of data errors and outliers, we trim (set to missing) all payout and other firm 
characteristic variables outside the 1st to 99th percentiles. Appendix II summarizes the definition of all 
variables, and Appendix III provides correlation statistics. 
A. Proxies of agency costs 
We refer to the literature for proxies of firm level agency costs. The first proxy we use is ownership 
concentration. As share ownership becomes concentrated, the nature of the agency problem shifts away 
from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders 
(Hope (2003); Fan and Wong (2002); Berle and Means (1932)). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that when 
ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are 
wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits that are not shared by minority 
shareholders. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) highlight the significance of this agency problem when 
they report that highly concentrated ownership in East Asian nations diminishes firm value.5 We measure 
ownership concentration using the fraction of shares that are closely held, as defined by Worldscope (Field: 
08021),6 and denote it as CloselyHeld. 
                                                           
5 Among other effects, concentrated ownership structure may be associated with incentives to reduce accounting information 
quality, even to the point where outside investors and analysts have little confidence in the firm’s reported earnings (Fan and 
Wong (2002)). Hope (2003) finds ownership concentration, measured at the country level, is negatively related to firms’ 
disclosure levels. Similarly, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) find earnings management is more pervasive in countries with a 
higher concentration of share ownership. 
6 Closely held shares include shares held by owners of more than 5 per cent of issued capital, shares held by officers, directors 
and their families, shares held in trust, shares held by another corporation (except in a fiduciary capacity by a bank) or shares 
held by a pension fund. 
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We investigate another dimension of share ownership, based on the independence indicator in the 
Osiris database from Bureau van Dijk. This indicator characterizes the degree of independence of a 
company with regard to its shareholders. Osiris provides 10 degrees of independence (A+, A, A-, B+, B, 
B-, C+, C, C- and D),7 which we convert into a score of 1 to 10 and denote this variable by Independence, 
with a score of 10 indicating the highest degree of independence and thus the lowest agency cost. 
From Osiris, we also extract information on the identity of the ultimate shareholder, defined as the 
largest shareholder with a direct and indirect holding greater than 25% of outstanding shares.8 The four 
major groups of controlling shareholders are insiders, comprising individuals, families, managers, and 
employees (Insiders); state or public authorities (State); financial institutions, comprising banks, insurance 
companies, mutual and pension funds, and financial companies (FinInstitutions); and others, comprising 
industrial companies and foundation or research and development institutes. Of the firms with an ultimate 
owner, 52% are controlled by insiders, 12% by financial institutions, 6% by states or public authorities, and 
30% by others. Insider-controlled firms are expected to have higher agency conflicts since insiders would 
prefer to retain a large part of earnings for rent extraction (Grossman and Hart (1988)).9 It is less clear-cut 
how well the other controlling groups capture agency conflicts as their preference for a particular payout 
policy may be driven by factors unrelated to agency cost. For example, financial institutions may prefer 
payouts for survivability (Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2009)) or meeting “prudent man” rules 
                                                           
7 Osiris assigns an A (Independence>8) if the firm has no recorded shareholders with more than 25% direct or total ownership. 
“A” firms are thus considered to be independent with no ultimate owner. “B” firms (5≤Independence≤7) have no recorded 
shareholders with more than 50% direct or total ownership, and one or more shareholders are recorded with more than 25% 
direct or total ownership. Firms are categorized “C” when they have one recorded shareholder with more than 50% direct or 
total ownership or when the source indicates that the company has an ultimate owner. “D” firms have one recorded shareholder 
with a direct ownership of over 50%. Since only “A” firms are truly independent, we also set Independence>8 as a dummy in 
the analysis. Similar results are obtained. 
8 Using other cutoffs (5%, 10% and 20%) yields similar conclusions. We base our analysis on the 25% cutoff since it provides a 
more powerful sample design by allowing us to focus our tests on firms that offer the most latitude for opportunistic behavior 
toward minority shareholders, and its implications for payout policy. 
9 That family-controlled firms have greater agency conflicts is well documented in the literature. For example, in Asian 
corporations, “Asia’s minority shareholders have every reason to worry about how they are treated … Dominant families, 
Byzantine corporate structures and overly cozy political relationships leave minority shareholders at a disadvantage” (Asia’s 
Stock Nightmare, 1997, p. 107). 
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(Gristein and Michaely (2005)), while states or public authorities may prefer higher payouts for political 
reasons.10 The controlling groups other than insiders are thus treated primarily as control variables in our 
tests. In testing the importance of these controlling owners in relation to payouts, we control for the 
percentage shareholding by the ultimate shareholder (Ultimate). 
We also proxy firm level agency costs by the quality of corporate governance using the measure 
developed by Brown and Caylor (2006). Governance is the equally weighted score of seven governance 
factors, as assessed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).11 Firms with higher corporate governance 
scores are expected to have lower agency costs since the ability of insiders to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ interests in these firms is more restricted, ceteris paribus.  
Our country level proxies for agency costs capture the quality of the legal framework, as in LLSV. 
The first measure is a dummy that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a civil law country, and zero 
otherwise. We also proxy the quality of investor protection using the LLSV’s antidirector rights index and 
its revised and corrected measures sourced from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
and Spamann (2010), respectively. The final measure is the anti self-dealing index, which provides a 
measure of shareholder protection from self-dealing by corporate insiders through corporate law. 
B. Control variables 
We control for differences in firm size in tests of the outcome model of total payouts. We measure firm 
size by the percentile market value of ordinary shares, the product of the number of shares outstanding and 
share price, for each country. This procedure ensures that the results are not swamped by countries with 
                                                           
10 In China, government-controlled firms use dividend payments to tunnel resources from listed companies thus exacerbating 
the agency problem (Chen, Jian and Xu (2009)). However, we do not have any evidence to show that dividends are also used by 
governments in other countries as a tunneling tool. 
11 The governance variable includes two external corporate governance factors (no unauthorized poison pills and no staggered 
board) and five internal corporate governance factors: option re-pricing did not occur within the last three years; average options 
granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares outstanding did not exceed 3% (option burn rate is not excessive); 
all directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for non-attendance; board guidelines are in each 
proxy statement; and directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines.  
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large firms, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In tests of the agency explanation for 
corporate payout choice, we also control for the tax advantage of dividends (TaxAdvantage), measured by 
the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends over the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in 
capital gains.12 We are able to compute the TaxAdvantage variable for every year for each country. Data on 
taxes are sourced from various issues of PricewaterhouseCoopers Worldwide Tax, Ernst & Young Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guide, American Council for Capital Information, and OECD Reports. 
II. Sample Profile and Univariate Tests 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for firm level characteristics. Total payouts of companies are higher 
in countries where the legal system is based on common law compared to countries with a civil law system. 
In particular, the median total payout ratio is 13.2% (1.2%) of cash flow (sales) in common law countries 
and 10.9% (0.9%) in civil law countries, respectively. These differences are economically and statistically 
significant. However when payouts are measured as a fraction of earnings, we do not find statistically 
significant differences across countries with different legal regimes. Similar findings are observed when 
only dividends are considered in the payout. 
<Table I> 
Of the proxies for agency costs, CloselyHeld and Independence are significantly different across the 
legal regimes. Relative to firms in common law countries, firms in civil law countries have significantly 
higher agency costs, as indicated by their more closely held shares and lower degree of independence from 
shareholders. This finding is consistent with other evidence of higher ownership concentration in countries 
with poorer shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999)). No 
significant difference in dividend tax advantage and the percentage ownership by each of the ultimate 
owners (insiders, states, and financial institutions) is observed across the legal regimes. 
                                                           
12 Details on the computation of dividend tax advantage can be found in Table A.1 of LLSV. 
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Table II provides detailed statistics on the percentage of corporate payers (either dividend payers or 
share repurchasers) by country and over time. For most of our sample period, about two-thirds of firms 
are dividend payers. In the most recent sample year (2006), dividends were paid by roughly three-quarters 
of the sample (average=71.0%; median=72.8%). Hong Kong, Canada, and Japan have the highest 
percentage of dividend payers in that year, about 90%. In contrast, just under half the firms in France, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey pay dividends. Grouping countries by legal origin shows that the mean 
and median proportions of dividend payers are not significantly different across the legal regimes. Similar 
results are found for the proportion of firms that repurchase shares. Ireland has by far the largest 
proportion of firms that repurchase their shares at 68.4%, compared to just 20.4% for the United States. 
<Table II> 
The average and median amounts of dividends paid each year constitute about 30% of net income, 
as Table III shows. The countries with a dividend payout (as a percentage of earnings) greater than 50% in 
the latest year (2006) are the Czech Republic (75.1%), New Zealand (61.1%), and Finland (54.6%).13 In 
2006, the global average (median) ratio of dividends to net income was 30.4% (28.0%) and this ratio has if 
anything remained constant over time. Partitioning countries by their legal origin, the results are generally 
consistent with LLSV’s contention that firms in civil law countries distribute less of their earnings as 
dividends compared to firms in common law countries. However, the difference in dividend payouts 
across the legal regimes is statistically insignificant. 
<Table III> 
Including share repurchases in the payout ratio does not materially affect the above result. The 
United States, Denmark, and Switzerland have the largest difference between the dividend and total payout 
ratios in most years, implying share repurchases (as a percentage of earnings) are highest in these countries. 
                                                           
13 Using the alternative denominators (operating cash flow and sales) for the payout ratio makes no material difference to the 
conclusions we draw from this table. 
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III. Results 
A. Country level agency costs and total payouts 
We begin our analysis by examining the outcome model of corporate payouts using total payouts, i.e. the 
sum of dividends and share repurchases, as the dependent variable. As in the LLSV’s original regression, 
we regress the total payout ratio on proxies for country level investor protection, a measure of growth 
opportunities, and its interaction with investor protection. Since the choice of denominator in the total 
payout ratio does not materially affect our conclusion, we report in detail only the results for the most 
common measure, Payout/Earnings.  
In the spirit of Spamann (2010), we run the tests using the various proxies of investor protection: 
legal regime; the LLSV’s original antidirector rights index; the revised (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2008)) and corrected (Spamann (2010)) antidirector rights index; and the anti self-
dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)). In addition to using these indices 
in their continuous form, we also transform them to dummies signaling low shareholder protection by 
setting them equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a country whose index value is below the median 
shareholder protection index at the country level, and zero otherwise. For ease of interpretation, we use the 
binary variable of investor protection in the interaction term. The decile rank of the firm’s industry-
adjusted historical annual sales growth rate (Growth) is used to proxy growth opportunities. 
We employ generalized least squares (GLS) random effects panel regressions with robust standard 
errors to estimate our models. We do not use firm fixed effects due to the lack of variability in firm 
characteristics over our relatively short period of study. 
Table IV shows the results are sensitive to how we calibrate investor protection. While legal regime is 
not significant, most of the investor protection indices are. Using the binary measure of investor 
protection, results show firms in low protection countries have on average lower total payouts than firms 
in high protection countries. For example, firms in countries with a lower than median score for the LLSV 
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antidirector rights index have on average a 7.9% lower payout than firms in other countries. Qualitatively 
similar results are found for the anti self-dealing index and Spamann’s corrected antidirector rights index 
(hereafter, Spamann’s measure). However, we do not find the same using the revised measure of 
antidirector rights index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008).  
<Table IV> 
When we replace the binary investor protection variable with a continuous one, results for the anti 
self-dealing index and Spamann’s measure remain intact. Therefore, consistent with the outcome model’s 
prediction, corporate payouts reflect the capacity of minority shareholders to use legal powers to force 
corporate insiders to disgorge cash, either in the form of dividends or repurchases. In particular, in low 
protection countries, a relatively ineffective legal system has a greater influence on corporate payout policy 
than any incentive managers may have to signal non-expropriation by distributing cash to shareholders. As 
articulated by LLSV, shareholders in weak protection countries will try to grab whatever cash they can get 
immediately, even though the amount may not be much. This prediction is however not supported using 
the continuous original and revised measures of antidirector rights index. 
The coefficient on sales growth (Growth) is significantly negative in all specifications. Its interaction 
with investor protection has a significantly positive coefficient when we proxy investor protection using 
the binary measure of the original and Spamann’s antidirector rights index, and the anti self-dealing index. 
When we use the continuous measure of investor protection, the interaction term is significantly positive 
for the Spamann’s measure. These results thus suggest that, in countries where investors enjoy greater 
protection, high growth firms have lower payouts presumably because investors know that when the 
company’s investments pay off, they will be able to extract more cash. This is in sharp contrast to weak 
protection countries, where sales growth matters less in shaping corporate payout policy. Results from the 
Spamann’s antidirector right index show a one decile increase in growth is associated with a 1.9% decrease 
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in payouts in high protection countries versus 1.7% in low protection countries. The revised antidirector 
rights index again yields findings contrary to the outcome model.  
In sum, results appear sensitive to the measure of investor protection used, with the revised 
antidirector rights index bearing results that often are different from other measures of investor protection. 
This finding is in line with the evidence in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), who 
report that the revised (and by construction the original) antidirector rights index is an inferior measure of 
investor protection than the conceptually less ambiguous anti self-dealing index. However, of all the 
measures of investor protection investigated, we find the results using the Spamann’s measure are the 
strongest and most consistent. Spamann (2010) finds that corrections to the antidirector rights index 
profoundly alter many of the most influential results derived with the antidirector right index, including the 
relationship between investor protection and ownership dispersion, size of equity markets, and resilience to 
the Asian financial crisis. Our results show, as with the relationship between efficient capital allocation and 
investor rights (Spamann (2010)), the outcome model of corporate payouts survives the corrections. Since 
the Spamann’s measure of antidirector rights index also offers the most reliable, consistent, and most easily 
reproducible measure of investor protection than the original and revised antidirector rights index 
(Spamann (2010)), we therefore focus on this measure in subsequent tests.  
Including share repurchases in the payout ratio does not appear to matter much. This is perhaps not 
surprising since at least in the United States repurchases are largely the province of dividend payers (Fama 
and French, 2001).  
B. Country and firm level agency costs and total payouts 
In Table V, we assess how firm level agency conflicts moderate the relationship between country level 
agency costs and total payouts by including various firm level proxies for agency costs in the tests. This 
allows us to test whether firm level agency conflicts can explain total payouts over and above country level 
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agency conflicts. To address endogeneity between firm level agency costs and payouts, we use lagged 
values of firm level agency cost measures (and other firm-specific characteristics) in the tests.14 
<Table V> 
Including firm level agency cost variables in the equation, we see that the Investor Protection 
variable remains significantly positive in most regressions. Therefore, controlling for firm level agency 
conflicts, firms in higher protection countries have significantly higher payouts. High growth firms have 
significantly lower payouts, and this relationship is stronger in high protection countries. The exception is 
Specification (3) which shows that when we control for the quality of firms’ corporate governance, the 
negative relationship between growth and payouts is stronger in low protection countries. Nevertheless, a 
caveat on this finding is in order since the ISS database covers mainly large and mid-cap firms. 
Firm level proxies of agency conflicts are important in explaining total payouts. All of them are 
significant and have the expected sign. Our results are thus consistent with the outcome model that high 
agency cost firms distribute less of their earnings to shareholders. In high protection countries, a one 
standard deviation decrease in the extent to which shares are closely held (equivalent to 25.9%) is 
associated with a 2.6% increase in total payouts (Specification (1)) whereas a one standard deviation 
increase in ownership independence (equivalent to 3.1 units) is associated with a 1.7% increase in total 
payouts (Specification (2)). The interaction terms show that these relationships are not significantly 
different between high and low protection countries.  
Better governed firms have higher payouts, consistent with the outcome model. The positive 
relationship between governance quality and payouts appears to be stronger in low protection countries, 
suggesting some substitutions between country and firm level governance mechanisms to curb agency 
                                                           
14 Using contemporaneous variables yields virtually identical results (untabulated), which is to be expected in light of the stability 
of firm level measures of agency costs. For example, it is rare for ownership structure and corporate governance to change 
dramatically over such a relatively short period (six years in our study). The exogeneity of the relationship between ownership 
and performance has been supported by Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2003), Gilson (2005) and Krivogorsky and Grudnitski 
(2008). The stability of our firm level agency cost variables suggests that agency conflicts are more likely to impact on corporate 
payouts rather than the other way round. 
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conflicts. A one standard deviation increase in the corporate governance score (equivalent to 1.20 units) is 
associated with a 2.1% increase in total payouts in high protection countries versus 6.2% in low protection 
countries (Specification (3)), all else equal. The same caveat about the usage of ISS data however applies. 
The identity of the ultimate owner also matters to payouts. Controlling for the percentage 
shareholding by the ultimate owner (Ultimate), results show firms whose ultimate shareholder is an insider 
have significantly lower payouts, consistent with the proposition that insiders pursue financial decisions 
that allow greater rent extraction (Grossman and Hart (1988)). Specifically, insider-dominated firms in high 
protection countries have a 3.6% lower payout (Specification (4)) than non insider-dominated firms. 
Having a financial institution or government (state) as the ultimate shareholder does not appear to matter 
to corporate payouts. 
Overall, we find support for the outcome model of total payouts using country level proxies of 
agency conflicts. These results mostly remain when firm level agency cost variables are controlled for in the 
tests. Although investors in high protection countries have the legal power to extract cash (in the form of 
dividends or share repurchases), we find agency conflicts at the firm level hinder their ability to do so. Firm 
level agency conflicts also matter to payouts in low protection countries. Notwithstanding the nature of 
firms covered by ISS, our results suggest that investor protection can be derived not only from legal rights 
provided by countries’ laws but also from firm level governance mechanisms. Evidence of substitutions 
between country and firm level investor protection has also been documented elsewhere in the literature 
(Miller and Reisel (2009); Bruno and Claessens (2007); Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008); Durnev 
and Kim (2005); Klapper and Love (2004)).  
C. The interaction between investment opportunities and agency costs on total payouts 
LLSV show that investment opportunities reduce dividend payouts in high protection countries but are 
unrelated to dividend payouts in low protection countries. We find support for this relationship using total 
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payouts for a larger sample drawn from a more recent and substantially longer time period. To test how 
firm level agency costs moderate this relationship, we first perform univariate tests of difference in total 
payouts for a 2×2×2 matrix of investor protection, growth opportunities, and firm level agency costs. 
Within this matrix, the best case scenario for investors insofar as payouts are concerned is when country 
level investor protection is high, and both growth opportunities and firm level agency costs are low, while 
the worst case scenario is when country level investor protection is low, and both growth opportunities 
and firm level agency costs are high.  
Table VI reports the univariate results. Irrespective of the level of protection investors enjoy at the 
country level, firms with low growth opportunities and agency costs have the highest payout. We do not 
find the difference in payouts for these two sets of firms to be significant across low and high protection 
countries. Interestingly, corporate governance quality appears to matter more in determining total payouts 
in low protection than high protection countries. In low protection countries, the difference in the average 
(median) payout between firms with high and low governance quality is about 18% (27%), irrespective of 
firm level growth opportunities. In comparison, in high protection countries, the difference in the average 
(median) payout is 0.8% (1.7%) for low growth firms and 4.1% (8.8%) for high growth firms. This finding 
reinforces the above evidence of substitutions between country and firm level investor protection. 
Importantly, Table VI shows that, in addition to country level investor protection and growth 
opportunities, firm level agency costs also matter to payouts. 
<Table VI> 
Multiple regressions for the interaction between country level agency costs (as proxied by investor 
legal protection), firm level agency costs, and investment opportunities in relation to total payouts are 
reported in Table VII. For ease of interpretation of the results for interaction variables, we use the binary 
Spamann’s antidirector rights index as the country level investor protection measure. For each measure of 
firm level agency cost, the sample median provides the cutoff for “high” and “low”; the exception is 
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Independence where the cutoff is a score of 8 (i.e., all “A” firms according to Osiris). Firms with insiders 
as the ultimate owner are considered to have “high” agency costs and, as before, are denoted by the 
dummy Insider. In the regression: 
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 ", 
the shift in the level of payout due to agency conflicts at the country and firm levels is represented by the β 
coefficients and the γ coefficients describe the relationship between growth opportunities and total payouts 
for firms with different country and firm level agency costs. We again lag all right hand side variables by 
one period to address potential endogeneity concerns. 
<Table VII> 
Looking at the β coefficients, results show that the average payout amount for low agency cost firms 
in high protection countries, as captured by the intercept term β0, is significantly positive. It is 32.3% in 
Specification (2), when firm level agency costs are measured by ownership independence. Moving to high 
agency cost firms in high protection countries reduces the payout to 22.9% (β0+β2). This drop in the 
payout amount (by 9.4%) is both statistically and economically greater (more than four times) than that 
observed for low protection countries. For low protection countries, moving from firms with low agency 
costs (β0+β1=28.1%) to high agency costs (β0+β1+β2+β3=26.3%) sees a reduction in total payouts by a 
magnitude of 2.2%.  
Therefore, although protection at either the firm or country level appears to be effective in increasing 
investors’ ability to extract surplus cash from firms, our regression results show that investors’ ability to do 
so is significantly enhanced if protection is provided at both the firm and country levels. The effectiveness 
of investor protection at the firm level in forcing firms to disgorge surplus cash is significantly greater in 
high protection countries. This finding is robust to alternative measures of firm level agency costs. 
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The γ coefficients describe the relationship between growth opportunities and total payouts for the 
following groups of firms: γ1 for low agency cost firms in high protection countries; γ1+γ3 for high agency 
cost firms in high protection countries; γ1+γ2 for low agency cost firms in low protection countries; and 
γ1+γ2+γ3+γ4 for high agency cost firms in low protection countries. An implication of the outcome model 
which we test here is that the relationship between investment opportunities and total payouts is strongest 
when country and firm level agency costs are low, but weakest when country and firm level agency costs 
are high. In between these extremes lie the cases where country and firm agency costs are in conflict, i.e., 
agency costs are high at the country level but low at the firm level, and low at the country level but high at 
the firm level. 
The estimated coefficient on Growth (γ1) is significantly negative, implying that high growth firms 
have significantly lower payouts when agency conflicts at both firm and country levels are low. This 
supports a prediction of the outcome model that in the presence of investment opportunities, investors are 
willing to defer the receipt of a return on their investment to a later period if they enjoy high protection at 
both the country and firm levels. For these firms, a one decile increase in growth decreases total payouts by 
about 2.2% (Specification (2)). 
Specification (2) shows that, as expected, the strength of the relationship between payouts and 
growth opportunities is reduced as agency costs at either the country or firm level increase. In high 
protection countries, a one decile increase in growth decreases the total payout by 0.8% (γ1+γ3) for high 
agency cost firms, which is significantly lower than the 2.2% (γ1) for low agency cost firms. In low 
protection countries, a one decile increase in growth decreases the total payout by 1.8% for low agency 
cost firms (γ1+γ2) and 1.3% for high agency cost firms (γ1+γ2+γ3+γ4). This pattern is also observed in 
Specification (4) when firm level agency costs are proxied by Insider, thus corroborating our findings of 
greater importance of firm level agency costs and growth opportunities in determining corporate payouts 
in high protection countries. Some protection, either at the firm or country level, is effective in enabling 
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investors to extract surplus cash in the face of investment opportunities, but the “best” outcome for 
corporate payouts occurs when protection is provided at both country and firm levels.  
However, we find evidence of possible substitutions between firm and country level investor 
protection when CloselyHeld and Governance are used to proxy firm level agency costs. For these 
measures, the negative relationship between growth and payouts is strongest when agency costs are high at 
both firm and country levels. 
D. Dividends or repurchases? 
In this section, we extend our tests of the outcome model to the choice of the form of payout (dividends only 
versus share repurchases) since dividends and share repurchases can play different roles in mitigating 
agency conflicts and their effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends on the extent of shareholder 
protection. Under the outcome model, shareholders in high protection countries are more able to use their 
legal powers to pressure firms to disgorge cash and, by extension, to dictate the preferred form of payout, 
i.e., committed dividend payments. Dividends are a stronger commitment device than repurchases since 
management is expected to maintain a stable dividend policy (Lintner (1956)) rather than a stable 
repurchase policy,15 particularly in high protection countries (Brown, How and Verhoeven (2008)). As a 
consequence, dividends are more likely to be the form of payout in high protection countries. Where 
shareholder protection is poor, we would not necessarily expect such a relationship. Shareholders in poor 
protection countries are likely to welcome any cash distribution – which may not be much, as the 
preceding sections show – irrespective of the form that the cash distribution takes. 
                                                           
15 Unlike dividends, repurchases are more discretionary and primarily serve to distribute temporary excess cash. Further, ex post 
deviations from the previous repurchase policy have less consequential impact on share price than deviations from the dividend 
policy (Allen and Michaely (2003)).  
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Table VIII reports the results from logistic regressions using a reduced sample of firms in countries 
where share repurchases were legal.16 The reported coefficients show the marginal effects, calculated at the 
mean value of the continuous variables using the method proposed by Ai and Norton (2003). We employ 
random effects panel logit regressions with robust standard errors where the dependent variable takes a 
value of one for firms with an increase in dividends (as their sole method of payment) and zero for firms 
with a share repurchase. For these firms, the substitution between the forms of payout is more obvious. 
Other determinants of the payout choice, as identified from the literature, are controlled for in our tests 
and are lagged, as before. 
<Table VIII> 
Consistent with the outcome model, results show the estimated coefficient on Investor Protection is 
significantly positive in all specifications except for (3). In Specification (1), for instance, firms in higher 
protection countries have a 0.8% higher probability, on average, of choosing dividends as the form of 
payout. Therefore, in higher protection countries, investors are more able to dictate that firms’ cash 
disbursements take the (preferred) form of dividends. This is consistent with dividends having less of a 
signaling role to play in poorer protection countries, where managers are more insulated from investor 
pressure, information asymmetry is likely to be resolved by direct communication between insiders and 
major stakeholder representatives, shareholdings are more concentrated, and minority shareholders are less 
protected (Brown, How and Verhoeven (2008)). The results are robust to controlling for firm level agency 
costs and other variables. 
Agency conflicts at the firm level are also significant in explaining corporate choice of the form of 
payout. Of the firm level agency cost variables investigated, the outcome model of payout choice is 
supported for the CloselyHeld variable in Specification (1). Specifically, in countries where investors enjoy 
                                                           
16 For example, repurchases have been prohibited in Austria and permitted in Belgium and Luxemburg, at least since 2005. 
Details on the laws on repurchases are summarized in Appendix IV. 
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greater protection, more closely held firms (higher agency conflict) tend to choose the more flexible option 
of repurchase while less closely held firms are more likely to choose dividends, thereby committing to the 
payout in the longer term. The reverse is observed for low investor protection countries.  
Although Independence (Specification (2)) and Insider (Specification (4)) are significant, their sign is 
opposite to the outcome model’s prediction of corporate payout choice. Independence has a significantly 
negative coefficient while its interaction with the investor protection dummy is significantly positive. 
Therefore, in high protection countries, dividends are less likely to be chosen as the preferred form of 
corporate payout by more independent firms. This association is much weaker in low protection countries.  
The identity of the ultimate owner is relevant to the form of payout choice in high protection 
countries. Controlling for the percentage shareholding by the ultimate owner, insider-dominated firms in 
high protection countries have a 0.75% higher probability, on average, of choosing dividends as the form 
of payout. The relationship between the identity of this ultimate owner and the payout choice is however 
flatter in low protection countries. While governance quality is not significant, its interaction with the low 
protection dummy is, suggesting that better governed firms in low protection countries are significantly 
more likely to choose dividends as a form of payout than their counterparts in high protection countries. 
The results for these firm level agency costs are thus more in line with the pre-commitment 
explanation of payout policy design (John and Knyazeva (2006)). The absence of a strong monitoring 
structure exacerbates the agency conflict and increases the demand for dividend pre-commitment so that 
firms with higher agency costs are more likely to choose the more costly method of cash distribution, i.e. 
dividends, as the form of payout.  
The above results are robust in the presence of other determinants of payout choice. Differences in 
tax rates between dividend income and capital gains have been suggested as a determinant of a firm’s 
choice between distributing funds as dividends or repurchasing shares (Moser, 2005). This is supported by 
our results, which show a positive marginal effect of the dividend tax advantage variable (TaxAdvantage) 
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on the probability of the payment of dividends. The marginal effect of earnings volatility (Volatility), 
measured by the standard deviation of earnings over the past five years divided by its average over the 
same period, is significantly negative. This is consistent with repurchases being the preferred instrument for 
the distribution of temporary, unsustainable cash flows (Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000); Guay 
and Harford (2000)).  
The existence of managerial stock options is likely to have an effect on the payout choice since 
managers who own stock options that are not dividend protected favor repurchases over dividends. 
Further, repurchases are often used to avoid increasing the number of shares on issue when executive 
stock options are exercised (Fenn and Liang (2001); Kahle (2002)). We proxy for the likelihood that 
employee stock options are exercised by a dummy (Options) that takes a value of one if either positive 
amounts of stock options are sold to employees or if employee stock option plans exist, and zero 
otherwise (Fields: 03496, 03449). Our results show that firms with stock options are less likely to have 
dividends as the sole means of payment, decreasing the average probability by about 10%. High growth 
firms (Growth) also have a higher marginal propensity of using committed dividends as the sole payout 
method. 
E. Further Robustness Tests 
We address a number of additional robustness issues in this section. The results are reported in Table IX. 
First, we note that the United States constitutes a relatively large proportion of the sample, as shown in 
Appendix I. To ensure our results are not driven by this country, we exclude it from the tests but find the 
results in Specification (1) for total payouts and Specification (6) for the choice of the form of payout do 
not change the conclusions in any material way.  
<Table IX> 
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We also test the robustness of our findings to altenative variable specifications. For example, in 
Specification (2), we subtract the industry median from the dependent variable but find the adjustment 
does not change the thrust of our results. We construct an index of corporate governance practices based 
on the 44 governance factors produced by ISS17 and use this to proxy firm level agency costs in 
Specification (3). It is highly correlated with the governance index we use in the paper (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.64). Not surprisingly, qualitatively similar results are obtained using this broader based 
governance index. Specifications (4) and (5) show qualitatively similar results are obtained when we cluster 
the standard errors by firm and when we use a tobit regression, respectively. 
IV.  Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive data set covering 43 countries between 2000 and 2006, we find support for the 
outcome model of total payouts (dividends and repurchases). Shareholder protection, as a country level 
measure of agency conflicts, is important in determining total payouts. In particular, firms in countries with 
a weaker system of shareholder protection distribute consistently less cash, whether as dividends or 
repurchases. This is consistent with shareholders in countries with an efficient legal system being able to 
pressure firms to distribute the free cash flow instead of using it for the private benefit of insiders. We 
investigate a number of alternative methods used to calibrate investor protection and find the corrected 
antidirector rights index by Spamann (2010) yields the strongest and most consistent results. We therefore 
add the outcome model of corporate payouts to the list of tests that survive the corrections to the 
antidirector rights index (Spamann (2010)). 
While the extent of legal protection of outside shareholders differs substantially across countries, our 
results show firm level proxies of agency conflicts are also important in explaining corporate payouts. 
Although investors have the legal power to extract cash in the form of dividends or share repurchases from 
                                                           
17 For a description of these governance factors, refer to Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2007). 
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firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered by agency costs at the 
firm level. In poor protection countries, investors can seek refuge in firm level governance mechanisms to 
curb agency conflicts, suggesting a substitution between country and firm level investor protection. Also 
consistent with the outcome model, we find that investment opportunities are negatively related to total 
payouts, and that this relationship is stronger in high protection countries. Taken together, our results 
show firm level agency conflicts and growth opportunities are important in determining payouts in high 
protection countries, but often less so in low protection countries. More importantly, the results suggest 
that having investor protection at both firm and country levels yields the most effective outcome, when 
assessed in terms of the extent to which investors can extract surplus cash from firms. 
We extend the test of the outcome model to consider the form of corporate payout. Our results 
show that, apart from their ability to extract cash from firms, investors in high protection countries are 
better able to dictate a more durable form of cash distribution, i.e. committed dividend payments. At the 
firm level, support for the outcome model of payout choice is found only when the extent to which the 
shares are closely held is used to proxy agency conflict.  
In sum, our findings are consistent with DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner’s (2008) conclusion that a 
simple asymmetric information framework that emphasizes the need to distribute free cash flows and that 
embeds agency costs (as in Jensen (1986)) and security valuation problems (as in Myers and Majluf (1984)) 
does a reasonable job of explaining the size and timing of observed payout policies and, to a lesser degree, 
their form (dividend versus stock repurchase). 
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Appendix I: Sample Coverage by Country and Year 
This table reports the number of observations of the sample by country and year. 
 
 
Countries 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of 
Firm-Years
Argentina 26          19          39          45          49          50          228               
Australia 372        385        436        497        494        503        2,687            
Austria 54          49          44          47          56          56          306               
Belgium 65          58          64          68          72          65          392               
Canada 450        493        510        565        551        502        3,071            
China 626        634        562        570        225        218        2,835            
Czech Republic 29          23          23          20          10          6            111               
Denmark 89          93          88          91          99          96          556               
Finland 96          85          81          84          87          79          512               
France 526        448        400        430        455        435        2,694            
Germany 396        340        348        410        422        407        2,323            
Hong Kong 415        461        506        561        534        539        3,016            
Hungary 18          19          16          19          18          16          106               
India 294        258        304        436        472        904        2,668            
Indonesia 132        167        147        134        144        93          817               
Ireland 34          26          36          34          34          37          201               
Israel 37          42          52          88          93          66          378               
Italy 142        126        117        128        147        147        807               
Japan 2,301     2,165     2,494     2,844     2,830     2,647     15,281          
Korea 438        497        496        555        567        527        3,080            
Luxembourg 11          10          16          19          21          19          96                 
Malaysia 440        483        565        655        635        622        3,400            
Mexico 88          76          80          82          79          84          489               
Netherlands 120        104        102        115        116        98          655               
New Zealand 55          59          69          67          67          62          379               
Norway 79          69          85          93          105        79          510               
Pakistan 61          71          70          82          85          82          451               
Peru 35          44          42          49          54          55          279               
Philippines 67          68          73          87          100        113        508               
Poland 36          52          68          101        91          70          418               
Portugal 36          33          31          39          40          32          211               
Russia 19          28          23          35          38          20          163               
Singapore 277        343        387        416        407        402        2,232            
South Africa 217        204        198        190        189        184        1,182            
Spain 107        99          90          90          99          97          582               
Sri Lanka 14          10          8            15          17          19          83                 
Sweden 139        137        137        178        177        126        894               
Switzerland 139        127        137        151        178        172        904               
Taiwan 764        896        1,032     984        902        963        5,541            
Thailand 216        243        293        331        309        310        1,702            
Turkey 77          118        134        131        127        74          661               
United Kingdom 761        700        738        811        827        803        4,640            
United States 3,037     3,082     3,127     3,241     3,094     3,583     19,164          
All countries 13,335   13,444   14,268   15,588   15,116    15,462   87,213           
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Appendix II: Variable Definitions 
 
This table summarises the test variables and how they are defined. Panel A contains all payout variables, Panel B firm and 
country level measures of agency costs, and Panel C other firm characteristics. All variables are trimmed at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile. Field numbers are from Worldscope. 
 
 
 
Variable Definition
Dividend payout The sum of common and preferred dividends (Field: 04551).
Share repurchases Funds used to decrease outstanding common or preferred stock (Field: 04751).
Total payout Dividend plus share repurchases.
Dividend/Earnings Dividend divided by net income (Field: 01751).
Dividend/Cash Flow Dividend divided by net cash flow from operations (Field: 04201).
Dividend/Sales Dividend divided by revenues or net sales (Field: 07241).
Payout/Earnings Total payout divided by net income (Field: 01751).
Payout/Cash Flow Total payout divided by net cash flow from operations (Field: 04201).
Payout/Sales Total payout divided by or net sales (Field: 07240).
CloselyHeld A measure of ownership concentration based on the fraction of shares that are closely held (Field: 08021).
Independence An indicator of the extent to which firms are independent from its shareholders. Obtained from Bureau van Dijk's
Osiris data base, which we convert into a score of 1 to 10 with a score of 10 indicating the highest degree of
independence.
Governance An equally weighted score of seven governance factors from Institutional Shareholder Services: (i) no unauthorized
poison pills; (ii) no staggered board; (iii) option re-pricing did not occur within the last three years; (iv) average options
granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares outstanding did not exceed 3%; (v) all directors attended at
least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for non-attendance; (vi) board guidelines are in each proxy statement;
and (vii) directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines.
Insider A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the ultimate shareholder comprises individuals, families, managers and
employees.
LowProtection A dummy indicating low investor protection, proxied by (i) legal regime, where it takes a value of one if the firm is
domiciled in a civil law country and zero in a common law country; (ii) the anti director rights index; and (iii) the anti self-
dealing index. In (ii) and (iii), LowProtection takes a value of one if the firm is headquartered in a country whose index
value is below the median shareholder protection index at the country level and zero otherwise. The anti director rights
index is based on the original LLSV, the revised (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), and the
corrected (Spamann, 2010) measures.
TaxAdvantage The after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends over the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains.
Ultimate The percentage shareholding of the ultimate shareholder, defined as the largest shareholder with a direct and indirect
holding greater than 25% of outstanding shares.
State A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the ultimate shareholder is state or public authorities.
FinInstitutions A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the ultimate shareholder is financial institutions, comprising banks,
insurance companies, mutual and pension funds, and financial companies.
Growth Industry-adjusted (relative to the worldwide median for that industry in that year) measure of sales growth rate, where
the growth rate is the average percentage change in the last five years’ annual sales.
Volatility The standard deviation of earnings over the past five years divided by its average over the same period.
Options A dummy that takes a value of one if either positive amounts of stock options are sold to employees (Field: 03496) or if
employee stock option plans exist (Field: 03449), and zero otherwise 
MarketToBook Market to book value equity
Panel A: Payouts
Panel B: Agency Costs
Panel C: Other Firm Characteristics
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Appendix III: Correlations of Variables 
This table shows the Pearson cross-correlations between the constructed variables used in the study. Growth is 
the decile rank of historical annual sales growth rates. CloselyHeld is the fraction of shares that are closely held 
in a firm. Independence indicates the degree of independence of the firm from its shareholders. Governance is 
the firm’s corporate governance index constructed from ISS data. TaxAdvantage is dividend tax disadvantage. 
Options is a dummy variable indicating the presence of employee stock options. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of annual income for the last 5 years divided by the average income.  
 
 
CloselyHeld Growth Independence Governance Tax Advantage Options
Growth -0.04
Independence -0.59 -0.06
Governance -0.27 0.03 0.16
Tax Advantage 0.10 -0.06 0.01 -0.12
Options -0.13 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.04
Volatility 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06
  
Appendix IV: Regulations on Share Repurchases Across Countries 
 
This table summarises the regulations on share repurchases across countries. 
 
 
(continued) 
Country Regulations
Argentina Allowed. Source: Lasfer (2000).
Australia Legal since 1989, but heavily restricted.  Relaxed in December 1995. Source:  Asjeet and Ramsay (2000).
Austria Prohibited. Only to fulfill obligations under employee stock option plans. Source: Lasfer (2000).
Belgium
Legal at least since 2005. Share repurchases should be tendered to all shareholders on the same terms by prospectus under the 
supervision of the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission. Source: Lasfer (2000).
Canada
At least since 1989. Source: Ginglinger and Hamon(2009). Paper link: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V7M-
4V7MSHB1&_user=62921&_coverDate=06%2F30%2F2009&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&vie
w=c&_searchStrId=1358399371&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000005418&_version=1&_u
China
Allowed. In September 2008, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced that firms would no longer require 
approval for share repurchase plans. Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/21/content_7044996.htm
Czech Republic
Allowed with restriction that it cannot be more than 50% of equity shares. Source: Weblink: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preferred_stock
Denmark
Legal since 1995. Companies can only use capital that may be distributed as dividends to repurchase shares and shareholders’ 
authorization must specify the maximum number of shares to be repurchased and the minimum and maximum price the company 
may pay for the share. Source: Lasfer (2000).
Finland
Legal since 1997. The maximum amount of shares that can be repurchased is limited to 5% of the total share capital. Source: 
Liljeblom, Eva and Pasternack, Daniel (2002).
France
Legal since July 1998 but must be accompanied by capital reductions (art. L. 223-34 Cod. Com.). According to the Economist 
(August 15, 1998), France is trying to liberalize the rules on share buybacks, but had not achieved that goal by 1998.
Germany
Effective since 1999. Even though companies were allowed to repurchases their shares since March 1998, uncertainty about the 
taxation of capital gains due to repurchases has led to the postponement of buyback schemes at companies such as BASF. Source: 
http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2004/1660/
Hong Kong
Legal since 1991. The maximum number of shares an issuer can repurchase is 10% of the existing issued share capital during the 
effective period of the mandate. Such mandate must be renewed by shareholders in a general meeting or the next AGM; otherwise it 
will expire at the next AGM (Main Board Rule 10.06). Source: http://www.nomura.com/research/pub/Gmg2007210548.pdf
Hungary Allowed. Source: Andras Kisfaludi (2004). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=699101
India
Legal since 1998. Circulars of many firms prohibit share reduction unless approved by High Court.  The buyback can be made by a 
board resolution if the quantity of buyback is or less than 10% of the paid up capital and free reserves; the buy-back is of less than 
25% of the total paid-up capital and fee reserves; and that the buy-back of equity shares in any financial year shall not exceed 25% 
of its total paid-up equity capital in that financial year. Source: http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpfi/0507001.html
Indonesia
Allowed. The transaction shall be performed subject to prevailing laws including, in the case of ordinary shares listed on the Jakarta 
and Surabaya Stock Exchanges, the decision of the Head of the Capital Market Supervisory Board (Bapepam Regulation Number 
XI.B.2). Source: http://www.bapepam.go.id/old/old/e_legal/rules/index.htm
Ireland
Allowed. After 1990 law amended in Companies Act of Ireland. Source: Cox (2009) 
http://www.lexmundi.com/images/lexmundi/PDF/Employee_Benefits/Stock_Option_Jurisdictions/Ireland_Global_Stock_Optio
n.pdf
Israel
Allowed. Under the Israeli law, the repurchase is subject to the company obtaining an approval from the Court in Israel.  Purchases 
shall be made in compliance with the applicable provisions of Section 302 of the Israeli Companies Law, 1999, the applicable 
provisions of Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the &#147;Exchange Act&#148;), and Regulation 
M promulgated under the Exchange Act. Source: 
http://www.lexdon.com/article/ECtels_Board_of_Directors_Approves/42304.html
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Appendix IV: Regulations on Share Repurchases Across Countries (continued) 
 
 (continued) 
Country Regulations
Italy
Legal since before 1997. Authorized by meeting of shareholders. Maximum of up to 10% of shares. Formalized by regulatory 
changes in 2003, firms can repeatedly purchase and sell their shares.  Off-market and over the counter share repurchases are not 
permitted. Sources: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD161.pdf; Kim et al. (2005); Survey of share repurchases; 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2007-Vienna/Papers/0483.pdf.
Japan Effective since 1995. Source: Zhang (2002).
Korea
Legal since 1994. In 1998, the Securities and Exchange Act was revised to abolish the 10% limit on share repurchases. Sources: 
Survey of share repurchases http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Corporate_Governance/Vol2/vol2.pdf
Luxembourg
Legal at least since 2005. A company is permitted to repurchase up to 10% of its share capital if this repurchase is specifically 
authorized by the company’s shareholders. Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/11502697/Luxembourg-Investment-Funds-Guide-
UCITS-SIF-UCI
Malaysia
Legal since 1997. Companies (Amendment) Act 1997 introduced section 67A allowing public companies to purchase their own 
shares or give financial assistance to any person for the purpose of purchasing their shares. Source: Low (2001).
Mexico
In 2003, CNBV issued new regulations for new issues and buybacks. Source: http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984906/Mexico-
updates-securities-regulation.html 
Netherlands
Effective since 2001.  Subject to punitive taxes.  Firms have to pay 33.3% withholding tax on the difference between repurchase 
price and average paid up capital per share. Sources: Lasfer (2000); Survey of share repurchases.
New Zealand
Legal at least since 2005. A company is permitted to repurchase up to 10% of its share capital if this repurchase is specifically 
authorized by the company’s shareholders. Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/11502697/Luxembourg-Investment-Funds-Guide-
UCITS-
Norway
Legal since January 1999. Firm are not allowed to hold more than 10% of their own shares at any point in time.  Requires 2/3 of the 
voting shares presented at the shareholder meeting.  Source: Skjeltorp (2004).
Pakistan
Allowed. The share repurchase process is governed by by Section 95A of the Companies Ordinance, from 1984 and the Companies 
(Buy-back of shares) Rules, from 1999. Companies intending to repurchase shares should comply with: (a) debt-equity ratio of 
60:40; (b) current ratio of 1:1; (c) financing by cash and distributable profit. Source: 
http://thefinancialdaily.com/NewsDetail/65378.aspx
Peru Allowed. Source: Nidal Rashid Sabri (2003). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Philippines Allowed. Source: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Poland Legal since 1997. Source: Nidal Rashid Sabri (2003). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Portugal Allowed. Source: Nidal Rashid Sabri (2003). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Russia
Allowed. See description of some share buybacks in source: http://www.asia.ru/russia/news/document23123.shtml; Roosenboom 
and Arno van den Beemt (2001) http://rof.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/2/253
Singapore
The Companies (Amendment) Act of 2005, which took effect on 30 January 2006, allows share repurchases to be funded by profits 
and can be held as treasury shares. Source: http://www.bowman.co.za/LawArticles/Law-Article.asp?id=-639353216
South Africa
Legal since 1999. Section 85(1) of the Companies Act 1973, as amended by the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999, enables a 
company to acquire its own shares provided that it is authorized to do so by its articles of association and the share repurchases has 
been approved by a special resolution passed by the members of the company. There are no restrictions on the source of the funds 
utilized to acquire the company’s shares. Source: Nidal Rashid Sabri (2003). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Spain
Allowed since at least 1990. Article 75 of the Spanish Law of Public Limited Companies states that the nominal value of acquired 
shares shall not exceed 10% of equity capital (reduced to 5% when shares are traded in the secondary official stock market). That is, 
a maximum of 5% of common stock may be bought back and kept as treasury stocks. Must be authorized by General Assembly. 
Source: González and González (2004).
Sri Lanka
Allowed. See an announcement of a recent repurchase plan in 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/DM_BLOG/Sections/frmNewsDetailView.aspx?ARTID=62970
Sweden
Legal since March 2000. Maximum of 10% of shares outstanding (SFS, 2000:66).  Approval by AGM and must come from 
distributable profit. Source: http://www.fma.org/Stockholm/Papers/Repurchase.pdf
Switzerland
Legal since 1992. Subject to punitive taxes. Sources: Survey of share repurchases. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
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Country Regulations
Taiwan
Allowed. Sources: 
http://www.ifc.org/searchresults.html?cx=009183910618791464029%3Aik2jtgcdpms&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-
8&q=buyback&sa=go#1059
Thailand
Allowed since 1995. Added in March 2002: the repurchase of shares of a listed company shall require an approval of its 
shareholders, except where the amount of repurchase of those shares is not in excess of 10 per cent of the paid-up capital, a 
listed company may prescribe in the regulation of the listed company that it shall be the authority of the board of directors of 
the listed company to approve such repurchase of shares. In case that the amount of shares repurchased by a listed company is 
in excess of 10per cent of its paid-up capital, the listed company shall repurchase those shares within 1 year from the date of 
approval of its shareholders. Source: http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/shares.htm; 
http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:_u47yJTvwnkJ:www.set.or.th/en/regulations/rules/disclosure_files_n/BorJorPor1104
_EN.pdf+repurchases&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9
Turkey
According to the Capital Markets Board Corporate Governance Principles (CMB Principles), from 1959, share buybacks are 
not permitted, save for certain limited exceptions; Source: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/801/1/stvkaf07a67.pdf
United 
Kingdom
Legal since 1981. SEC adopted safe-harbor rule (10b-18) in 1982.  Before executing a repurchase transaction, a UK firm must 
have articles of association permitting repurchases and a special resolution conferring repurchase authority. A special resolution 
requires a firm to send a meeting notice to shareholders and to obtain a 75% majority of shares voting at the meeting. Sections 
160(1) and (2) of the Companies Act 1985 require shares to be repurchased either out of distributable profits or out of the 
proceeds of a fresh issue of shares made specifically for that purpose. Before 1 December 2003, firms had to cancel 
repurchased shares and could not hold them as treasury stock for re-sale. Source:  http://www.mbs.ac.uk/research 
/accounting finance/documents/Repurchases.doc
United States
Legal since 1983. A firm’s board of directors can authorize repurchases. Regular share repurchases may lead the Internal 
Revenue Service to treat repurchases as dividends. Source: Survey of share repurchases. 
http://www.ifc.org/searchresults.html?cx=009183910618791464029%3Aik2jtgcdpms&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-
8&q=buyback&sa=go#1059
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports the country medians of firm specific variables for 43 countries from 2001 to 2006. Only firms with positive net earnings, net cash flows and net sales are 
included. Dividend/Earnings, Dividend/Cash Flow and Dividend/Sales are dividends divided by net income, cash flows and sales, respectively. Payout/Earnings, Payout/Cash 
Flow and Payout/Sales are total payout (dividends plus share repurchase) divided by net income, cash flows and sales, respectively. Growth is the growth decile in industry-
adjusted annual sales. CloselyHeld is the percentage of closely held shares in a firm. Independence indicates the degree of independence of the company from its shareholders. 
Governance is the firm’s corporate governance index constructed from ISS data. TaxAdvantage is a proxy for the dividend tax advantage. Insider, State and FinInstitutions, 
respectively, take a value of one for firms with insiders, states or financial institutions as the ultimate owner and zero otherwise. p-values from t-test and Kruskal-Wallis (country 
level) are reported at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
         (continued) 
Country
Dividend/
Earnings
Dividend/
Cash Flow
Dividend/
Sales
Payout/
Earnings
Payout / 
CashFlow
Payout/
Sales
Growth Closely-
Held
Indepen- 
dence
Gover- 
nance
Tax 
Advantage
Insider State Fin-
Institutions
Australia 33.0 20.1 1.8 35.7 21.6 1.9 8.0 46.6 10.0 4.4 0.8 6.6 0.6 1.9
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 18.9 10.0 4.4 0.8 5.8 0.1 2.0
Hong Kong 17.9 12.0 1.1 19.1 12.8 1.2 6.0 63.5 7.0 2.4 1.0 38.5 1.6 4.9
India 18.0 10.9 1.3 19.1 11.7 1.4 7.0 52.3 9.0 2.7 0.7 6.9 1.0 0.0
Ireland 17.2 11.5 0.9 19.2 13.2 1.0 7.0 30.6 10.0 4.4 0.6 13.6 0.0 6.1
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 61.1 8.0 3.0 0.8 5.0 1.0 4.0
Malaysia 19.5 11.8 1.2 20.6 12.2 1.2 6.0 53.4 8.0 1.0 12.4 3.4 1.8
New Zealand 53.9 32.7 3.0 55.1 34.2 3.1 7.0 53.3 8.0 3.7 1.0 6.7 4.7 8.4
Pakistan 34.8 22.1 2.2 34.8 22.1 2.2 6.0 60.5 7.0 0.9 0.5 6.4 0.5
Singapore 20.0 12.0 1.1 20.4 12.3 1.1 7.0 61.6 7.0 2.7 1.0 18.7 3.9 3.9
South Africa 18.5 12.4 0.9 20.3 13.3 1.0 7.0 52.0 8.0 3.5 1.1 12.0 0.3 2.8
Sri Lanka 24.9 16.0 2.2 24.9 16.1 2.2 6.0 56.4 8.0 1.0 0.0 2.6 1.3
Thailand 33.4 20.4 2.1 33.6 20.6 2.1 7.0 58.9 8.0 1.0 2.0 3.4 0.8
United Kingdom 28.8 17.4 1.4 31.2 18.4 1.5 6.0 29.7 10.0 5.0 0.9 10.8 0.2 3.1
United States 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.7 6.1 0.5 6.0 24.8 10.0 3.8 0.9 12.2 0.0 1.3
Common Law Median 19.5 12.0 1.2 20.4 13.2 1.2 7.0 53.3 8.0 3.7 0.9 6.9 1.0 2.0
Common Law Mean 21.3 13.3 1.3 23.1 14.3 1.4 6.6 48.2 8.5 3.6 0.9 10.1 1.9 2.8
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 70.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.5 4.5
Austria 24.1 11.7 1.0 24.7 11.8 1.1 6.0 63.3 7.0 2.8 0.8 16.7 7.8 8.5
Belgium 30.3 12.7 1.1 33.0 14.3 1.3 7.0 56.9 7.0 2.7 0.9 14.5 5.1 5.4
China 33.2 19.4 2.2 33.4 19.5 2.2 8.0 59.9 7.0 3.5 0.8 26.2 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 17.6 7.7 1.0 17.6 7.7 1.0 6.0 91.4 1.0 4.0 0.9 0.0 12.8 4.3
Denmark 19.6 9.7 0.8 23.1 11.5 1.0 6.0 48.9 7.0 3.8 0.6 9.8 0.0 2.4
Finland 45.5 24.1 2.3 48.2 25.2 2.4 6.0 35.1 10.0 4.4 1.1 9.8 4.6 2.2
France 21.4 10.4 0.8 22.3 11.0 0.9 6.0 62.4 7.0 3.7 0.7 38.7 2.8 5.7
Germany 15.4 6.5 0.5 17.4 7.3 0.5 6.0 61.1 7.0 3.2 0.6 31.0 2.2 3.4
Hungary 3.2 1.6 0.2 7.3 4.8 0.6 7.0 69.6 7.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics (continued) 
 
Country
Dividend/
Earnings
Dividend/
Cash Flow
Dividend/
Sales
Payout/
Earnings
Payout / 
CashFlow
Payout/
Sales
Growth Closely-
Held
Indepen- 
dence
Gover- 
nance
Tax 
Advantage
Insider State Fin-
Institutions
Indonesia 7.5 4.1 0.3 7.7 4.1 0.3 7.0 71.4 7.0 0.7 2.1 0.7 1.2
Italy 30.9 14.6 1.5 31.7 14.7 1.6 7.0 56.7 1.0 3.4 0.6 15.8 4.5 6.6
Japan 20.7 10.0 0.5 22.4 10.7 0.5 4.0 42.9 10.0 3.3 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.4
Korea 12.8 7.1 0.6 15.5 8.7 0.7 7.0 37.4 9.0 4.3 0.7 24.1 1.1 1.7
Luxembourg 22.2 11.9 1.8 25.5 13.2 2.0 7.0 41.7 7.0 3.3 0.7 4.4 8.8 1.5
Mexico 6.8 4.0 0.4 13.3 7.7 0.6 6.0 79.0 8.0 2.3 1.0 5.7 0.3 3.4
Netherlands 24.3 11.8 0.8 28.7 14.4 1.0 6.0 43.7 8.0 2.8 0.7 7.1 0.5 3.3
Norway 18.0 9.4 0.7 20.2 11.3 1.0 7.0 47.7 7.0 3.4 1.1 14.7 9.1 1.6
Peru 5.7 3.2 0.3 5.8 3.2 0.4 5.0 74.0 3.0 1.0 11.6 0.0 7.2
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 80.0 7.0 0.9 0.9 0.0 1.6
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 60.2 7.0 0.9 19.1 7.2 6.4
Portugal 20.4 7.7 0.7 27.1 11.0 0.8 6.0 65.3 7.0 2.2 0.6 18.9 0.0 4.1
Russia 9.6 4.6 0.9 12.9 5.6 1.0 9.0 76.3 7.0 1.0 7.5 0.0 3.4
Spain 25.6 13.9 1.6 29.1 15.5 1.7 6.0 53.5 7.0 2.3 0.9 15.5 0.0 6.2
Sweden 27.3 15.6 1.4 28.4 16.4 1.4 6.0 36.2 9.0 4.2 0.8 10.1 0.7 7.4
Switzerland 24.1 12.7 1.2 28.9 14.9 1.4 6.0 47.4 7.0 4.4 0.6 18.7 7.2 2.6
Taiwan 9.7 6.6 0.5 12.3 8.3 0.7 8.0 24.9 10.0 1.2 1.4 0.1 0.0
Turkey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 65.8 8.0 0.6 18.8 2.2 1.0
Civil Law Median 18.8 8.6 0.8 21.3 10.9 0.9 6.0 60.0 7.0 3.4 0.8 10.8 0.9 3.3
Civil Law Mean 17.0 8.6 0.8 19.2 9.7 0.9 6.4 57.9 6.8 3.4 0.8 12.3 2.9 3.4
All Median 19.5 11.5 0.9 20.4 11.8 1.0 6.0 56.4 7.0 3.5 0.9 10.1 1.0 2.8
All Mean 18.6 10.4 1.0 20.6 11.4 1.1 6.5 54.4 7.4 3.5 0.8 11.4 2.5 3.2
Common vs Civil Law
Difference in Medians 0.72 3.48 0.43 -0.86 2.34 0.32 1.00 -6.70 1.00 0.33 0.10 -3.90 0.06 -1.37
p-value (KW) 0.42 0.05 0.07 0.40 0.05 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.39 0.95 0.45
Difference in Means 4.32 4.68 0.45 3.89 4.56 0.44 0.24 -9.70 1.75 0.27 0.09 -2.16 -0.96 -0.59
p-value (t-statistic) 0.30 0.05 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.07 0.45 0.06 0.01 0.37 0.14 0.50 0.35 0.46
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Table II: Percentage Payers by Country 
 
This table shows the percentage of firms per country with non-zero dividends or repurchases from 2001 to 2006. Only firms with positive net earnings, net cash flows and 
net sales are included. p-values from t-test and Kruskal-Wallis (country level) are reported at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
(continued) 
 
 
 
Country ALL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ALL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Australia 78.6 83.7 82.5 82.9 82.5 56.9 53.7 11.2 11.7 8.3 11.1 9.8 11.9 13.8
Canada 85.8 86.7 85.1 82.4 83.2 87.0 90.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.7 1.5
Hong Kong 91.6 85.7 100.0 100.0 86.7 88.2 94.7 8.9 15.9 9.9 7.8 7.2 5.9 8.0
India 70.0 59.7 63.0 67.6 69.2 77.3 78.4 9.4 14.8 14.5 13.7 9.9 7.8 5.5
Ireland 76.3 80.0 79.3 71.9 70.6 77.8 78.5 60.3 41.3 50.7 62.4 62.8 68.0 68.4
Israel 63.1 55.2 60.9 65.2 65.0 70.0 83.3 32.9 33.9 33.7 36.8 34.1 28.2 31.5
Malaysia 51.9 55.6 57.9 31.3 52.6 50.0 62.5 8.9 4.3 4.6 7.0 6.9 12.8 17.4
New Zealand 55.6 53.8 48.5 53.7 59.7 60.4 60.2 11.7 10.0 17.5 13.0 11.6 10.6 7.5
Pakistan 57.8 48.1 50.7 61.2 55.9 62.9 65.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 41.9 36.4 36.1 39.8 41.6 46.8 49.8 14.3 21.7 16.7 22.2 10.0 11.0 9.9
Thailand 53.8 57.1 52.3 52.4 46.9 50.0 63.6 4.5 8.2 3.5 4.1 3.5 3.7 4.6
United Kingdom 73.0 69.4 75.8 80.6 66.7 75.0 71.9 5.3 0.0 0.0 12.5 6.7 5.9 5.6
United States 65.7 55.3 59.3 66.7 71.1 70.9 72.8 19.0 24.8 14.4 16.7 24.0 14.3 20.4
Common Law Median 65.7 57.1 60.9 66.7 66.7 70.0 71.9 9.4 11.7 9.9 12.5 9.8 10.6 8.0
Common Law Mean 66.5 63.6 65.5 65.8 65.5 67.2 71.2 14.4 14.3 13.4 16.1 14.5 14.1 14.9
Argentina 66.9 68.3 68.6 64.7 63.8 68.4 68.2 1.5 0.5 2.2 2.4 1.5 1.6 0.8
Austria 62.4 59.8 56.4 59.5 60.6 67.6 69.2 15.0 16.7 17.5 17.6 12.9 12.8 12.5
Belgium 81.8 87.4 89.9 86.2 84.2 84.1 73.9 29.6 5.7 13.3 10.3 30.2 44.2 56.3
China 69.2 63.5 60.8 66.7 69.7 73.4 79.1 6.8 7.7 5.6 0.0 7.7 12.5 16.7
Czech Republic 68.4 74.8 70.8 66.0 61.4 68.7 71.1 34.5 20.8 35.8 31.8 34.8 36.1 45.2
Denmark 78.4 81.8 67.8 75.4 76.1 85.1 83.9 15.5 21.7 12.3 5.4 11.8 21.2 19.3
Finland 80.7 73.8 81.7 81.4 84.1 78.8 82.9 20.5 8.7 9.7 13.2 15.2 29.9 42.9
France 43.1 37.3 38.2 46.6 36.8 46.0 49.6 13.6 11.6 13.2 13.1 12.7 12.4 18.4
Germany 67.1 69.3 63.0 64.3 62.5 70.5 73.1 23.5 5.6 29.4 12.5 33.3 29.4 31.3
Hungary 54.1 35.3 35.7 42.0 62.2 75.3 70.8 17.3 21.2 19.2 5.6 5.9 21.2 31.4
Dividend payers Repurchasers
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Table II: Percentage Payers by Country (continued) 
 
 
 
Country ALL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 ALL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indonesia 73.9 74.1 69.4 72.7 72.3 75.0 78.6 10.2 8.7 6.4 6.1 2.7 15.1 19.5
Italy 72.5 77.5 62.4 71.6 71.4 73.7 78.1 2.6 4.1 2.5 0.7 2.5 2.3 4.7
Japan 86.9 88.5 92.9 81.5 84.5 83.9 89.9 24.4 17.9 30.4 28.9 20.2 23.0 27.2
Korea 70.2 70.0 69.6 75.0 67.0 68.4 72.0 32.2 39.2 38.1 30.6 17.7 23.9 47.5
Luxembourg 58.3 65.2 64.4 56.3 50.7 54.0 60.2 13.0 6.3 13.0 16.1 16.1 10.9 12.2
Mexico 67.7 82.4 73.1 63.9 58.8 64.7 64.9 24.4 0.0 0.0 16.7 10.0 35.7 36.4
Netherlands 78.2 73.2 71.4 73.5 78.9 83.0 87.1 26.4 30.8 12.5 15.0 21.4 38.5 44.4
Norway 71.8 75.0 70.2 69.6 68.7 71.6 75.5 40.9 38.5 39.0 42.1 39.5 41.9 44.0
Peru 40.2 22.2 28.8 38.2 39.6 44.0 55.7 17.3 17.1 26.0 21.5 13.2 14.6 13.8
Philippines 69.8 81.8 70.0 56.3 57.9 81.0 73.7 37.1 30.7 34.9 20.0 33.3 43.9 53.8
Poland 77.3 73.7 75.0 82.6 80.0 73.7 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 76.6 74.8 70.7 73.3 74.4 83.8 82.5 16.6 11.6 12.2 13.6 15.0 20.2 26.2
Sri Lanka 44.0 40.4 38.7 40.8 42.7 45.2 54.7 40.1 42.1 38.5 38.7 35.5 39.4 45.9
Switzerland 36.0 76.9 31.6 20.5 22.2 34.7 42.0 28.0 33.8 26.4 29.6 25.1 26.5 27.5
Taiwan 53.8 51.1 51.3 53.8 48.8 54.4 63.1 4.6 11.8 14.3 0.0 6.9 0.0 3.0
Turkey 43.1 43.2 54.8 44.2 37.5 43.0 42.4 38.2 46.4 46.8 38.8 29.7 32.8 34.4
Russia 66.3 69.1 61.3 66.4 63.5 64.4 75.4 7.3 6.7 5.0 5.3 18.2 9.1 0.0
Singapore 76.0 82.0 74.0 69.3 74.2 73.0 82.6 19.9 24.0 41.9 24.4 14.5 14.1 16.0
South Africa 41.3 61.0 27.1 24.6 26.7 53.5 78.4 44.3 40.0 52.4 52.4 34.6 48.1 40.0
Spain 72.5 78.7 75.0 73.2 68.6 69.9 70.4 30.6 17.8 28.0 28.6 29.1 35.2 42.9
Civil Law Median 68.8 73.5 68.2 66.2 63.6 70.2 73.4 20.2 16.9 15.9 15.6 15.6 22.1 27.4
Civil Law Mean 64.9 67.1 62.2 62.0 61.7 67.1 71.0 21.2 18.2 20.9 18.0 18.4 23.2 27.1
All Median 68.4 69.4 64.4 66.4 65.0 70.0 72.8 16.6 14.8 14.3 13.6 13.2 14.6 19.3
All Mean 65.4 66.0 63.2 63.2 62.8 67.1 71.0 19.2 17.1 18.6 17.5 17.2 20.5 23.4
Common vs Civil Law
Difference in Medians -3.12 -16.32 -7.31 0.45 3.03 -0.20 -1.53 -10.80 -5.17 -5.98 -3.06 -5.79 -11.47 -19.36
p-value (KW) 0.95 0.61 0.99 0.99 0.82 0.83 0.67 0.94 0.28 0.84 0.44 0.53 0.60 0.60
Difference in Means 1.58 -3.47 3.33 3.81 3.84 0.08 0.22 -6.76 -3.91 -7.53 -1.88 -3.91 -9.16 -12.20
p-value (t-statistic) 0.95 0.75 0.89 0.95 0.82 0.84 0.52 0.43 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.18 0.23 0.26
Dividend payers Repurchasers
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Table III: Dividends and Total Payouts over Net Income by Country 
 
This table shows the country averages of dividends and total payout per firm scaled by net earnings. Only firms with positive net earnings, net cash flows and 
net sales are included. p-values from t-test and Kruskal-Wallis are reported at the bottom of the table. 
 
 
(continued) 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Australia 42.5 37.4 36.2 33.0 40.2 41.1 45.9 39.7 39.6 36.3 44.5 44.5
Canada 18.0 19.6 23.5 25.9 29.5 31.4 24.1 23.8 28.5 29.9 33.9 36.5
Hong Kong 31.2 27.8 26.4 24.9 27.9 30.6 33.2 29.5 27.6 25.9 28.7 31.5
India 30.8 33.3 25.9 22.9 22.5 20.6 35.2 35.7 29.4 24.9 24.4 21.9
Ireland 31.4 19.7 24.2 18.2 20.3 21.5 35.2 25.3 26.4 23.8 24.4 28.7
Israel 22.9 28.6 29.1 25.8 28.6 29.2 26.2 32.8 29.5 28.3 32.7 34.4
Malaysia 30.5 30.1 27.6 25.9 31.2 30.6 31.7 30.6 28.4 26.6 33.2 32.8
New Zealand 57.2 49.8 48.1 49.8 57.9 61.1 57.8 55.6 51.3 52.0 60.1 62.6
Pakistan 42.1 44.8 41.5 39.0 33.0 34.3 42.1 44.8 41.6 39.0 33.0 34.3
Singapore 30.1 27.4 28.6 27.2 32.8 30.7 31.5 28.3 29.2 27.8 34.2 31.2
South Africa 19.0 19.5 24.7 28.0 28.7 29.1 22.0 23.4 28.0 30.2 35.1 36.4
Sri Lanka 29.5 46.9 43.0 21.9 22.6 27.5 29.5 46.9 48.2 23.0 22.9 30.0
Thailand 28.6 34.5 40.0 39.9 44.1 46.2 28.6 34.9 40.6 40.8 44.4 46.5
United Kingdom 39.9 38.2 38.6 34.4 31.5 29.7 43.9 42.0 43.2 38.6 37.1 36.5
United States 16.9 16.6 16.6 16.0 17.2 21.5 30.7 30.4 30.5 30.0 35.1 41.9
Common Law Median 30.5 30.1 28.6 25.9 29.5 30.6 31.7 32.8 29.5 29.9 33.9 34.4
Common Law Mean 31.4 31.6 31.6 28.9 31.2 32.3 34.5 34.9 34.8 31.8 34.9 36.6
Argentina 68.0 16.8 6.5 9.8 20.3 16.2 70.4 17.8 6.5 11.9 20.3 16.2
Austria 31.1 32.9 37.1 30.6 21.0 23.1 33.4 34.1 38.8 32.4 22.6 24.9
Belgium 34.4 42.8 37.4 33.0 35.7 31.6 34.9 45.4 38.2 39.8 43.0 39.9
China 50.6 45.0 41.2 39.8 25.1 20.6 50.6 45.0 41.2 40.0 26.1 21.4
Czech Republic 18.2 24.5 24.0 25.5 44.3 75.1 18.3 24.5 24.0 25.5 44.8 75.8
Denmark 29.1 23.4 31.3 23.7 25.5 23.7 31.5 30.5 37.4 34.3 36.2 36.3
Finland 49.7 61.4 58.6 64.9 45.3 54.6 52.8 62.5 59.7 67.0 48.9 58.3
France 28.4 28.0 30.5 27.3 24.6 25.4 29.6 29.8 32.9 30.2 29.1 29.3
Germany 36.9 35.7 30.1 21.3 24.2 21.8 38.7 36.9 33.3 23.3 26.0 25.0
Hungary 30.2 31.7 25.9 19.0 16.7 22.0 30.3 37.1 25.9 25.7 19.5 27.1
Dividend/Earnings Total Payout/Earnings
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Table III: Dividends and Total Payouts over Net Income by Country (continued) 
 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indonesia 20.5 19.8 22.4 26.2 23.0 25.1 21.7 21.2 22.4 26.6 23.6 25.3
Italy 38.9 37.3 38.0 38.3 36.2 40.9 40.2 38.6 38.9 39.4 38.1 44.0
Japan 29.5 33.3 28.8 25.7 26.0 28.0 32.4 37.4 34.6 30.7 29.2 32.0
Korea 16.5 15.1 20.5 18.3 19.6 23.8 23.6 19.6 25.6 23.6 24.1 30.1
Luxembourg 49.8 43.9 45.2 22.5 33.2 25.1 49.8 43.9 52.3 22.7 48.8 34.8
Mexico 22.8 19.8 20.4 13.8 17.5 22.9 29.6 29.1 30.4 20.9 24.6 32.3
Netherlands 32.6 30.5 32.5 32.5 27.0 30.0 38.0 37.3 37.7 37.1 33.0 37.6
Norway 28.3 19.6 36.7 27.3 31.6 24.4 36.1 22.9 40.5 31.0 36.5 32.4
Peru 41.3 34.0 30.3 25.5 27.8 33.5 42.5 35.3 32.2 30.0 29.5 33.5
Philippines 18.8 18.4 17.4 17.0 22.0 19.7 22.8 24.1 20.9 19.5 25.4 21.1
Poland 7.4 7.5 17.8 15.7 19.3 27.7 7.4 13.3 19.7 17.9 21.1 30.6
Portugal 38.0 34.2 35.3 23.4 25.0 27.3 42.5 40.3 41.0 28.8 30.2 33.7
Russia 12.1 20.5 18.6 13.5 18.5 15.0 13.2 22.9 22.4 16.7 22.8 25.2
Spain 31.6 25.5 28.7 32.0 33.8 32.5 35.2 27.8 31.2 35.1 40.7 39.6
Sweden 39.3 32.7 34.7 31.0 27.2 34.9 42.9 36.8 38.2 33.1 31.7 40.7
Switzerland 36.8 31.2 28.1 22.3 23.1 27.4 42.1 39.1 33.2 32.5 33.5 42.4
Taiwan 14.8 14.7 18.4 27.8 39.3 38.3 18.6 16.4 20.6 30.8 41.0 40.6
Turkey 22.4 10.8 12.8 9.7 23.2 30.1 22.4 10.8 12.8 9.7 23.2 30.1
Civil Law Median 30.7 29.3 29.5 25.5 25.1 26.4 34.1 32.3 33.0 30.1 29.4 32.4
Civil Law Mean 31.4 28.2 28.9 25.6 27.0 29.3 34.0 31.4 31.9 29.2 31.2 34.3
All Median 30.5 30.1 28.8 25.8 27.0 28.0 33.2 32.8 32.2 30.0 32.7 33.5
All Mean 31.4 29.4 29.8 26.8 28.5 30.4 34.2 32.7 32.9 30.1 32.5 35.1
Common vs Civil Law
Difference in Medians -0.17 0.84 -0.86 0.45 4.40 4.23 -2.47 0.49 -3.53 -0.19 4.48 1.99
p-value (KW) 0.89 0.35 0.45 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.98 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.20 0.27
Difference in Means 0.02 3.37 2.70 3.23 4.19 3.02 0.54 3.48 2.94 2.65 3.70 2.35
p-value (t-statistic) 1.00 0.36 0.41 0.33 0.14 0.42 0.89 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.20 0.51
Dividend/Earnings Total Payout/Earnings
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Table IV: Regressions for Total Payouts, Investor Protection and Investment Opportunities 
 
This table shows the results for the cross-section of 43 countries for 2001-2006 from generalized least squares (GLS) random effects panel regressions with robust standard 
errors. The dependent variable (total payout) is dividends plus share repurchases divided by net income. Investor Protection is measured as either a binary variable 
(LowProtection), which takes a value of one for low protection countries (Index<sample median) and zero otherwise, or a continuous variable. Growth is the decile rank of 
industry-adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. p-values are reported in parentheses. Industry dummies and market capitalization are included but not reported. 
 
 
  
Legal 
Regime
LLSV Anti 
Director 
Rights Index
Revised Anti 
Director 
Rights Index
Anti Self-
Dealing 
Index
Spamann's 
Measure
LLSV Anti 
Director 
Rights Index
Revised Anti 
Director 
Rights Index
Anti Self-
Dealing 
Index
Spamann's 
Measure
Investor Protection 0.38 -7.93 -0.18 -6.42 -3.01 -0.33 -2.23 10.49 2.20
(0.65) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth -1.61 -1.83 -1.50 -1.70 -1.94 -1.67 -1.31 -1.69 -2.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection×Growth -0.03 0.95 -0.27 0.46 0.29 -0.16 -0.78 0.12 0.38
(0.78) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.16) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00)
Constant 28.83 30.82 29.03 29.93 30.69 30.67 37.38 22.18 20.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 78,570       75,538       78,570        78,570        71,796       75,538        78,570         78,570         71,796        
Number of Firms 23,900       22,701       23,900        23,900        21,569       22,701        23,900         23,900         21,569        
Wald Statistic 2,106         2,169         2,145          2,135          2,175         2,136          2,150           2,171           2,353          
Binary Measure of Investor Protection (<Median) Continuous Measure of Investor Potection 
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Table V: Regressions for Total Payouts, Investor Protection, Firm Level Agency Costs 
and Investment Opportunities  
 
This table shows the results for the cross-section of 43 countries for 2001-2006 from generalized least squares random 
effects panel regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable (total payout) is dividends plus share 
repurchases divided by net income. Investor Protection is the Spamann’s measure of antidirector rights index. 
LowProtection takes a value of one if Spamann’s antidirector index<sample median, and zero otherwise. Growth is 
the decile rank of industry-adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is 
shown in the heading of columns (1)-(4). Independence is the degree of firms’ independence from shareholders. 
CloselyHeld is the fraction of shares closely held in a firm. Governance is the ISS corporate governance index. Insider, 
State and FinInstitutions, respectively, take the value of one for firms with insiders, states, or financial institutions as 
the ultimate owner, and zero otherwise. Ultimate is the percentage shareholding of the ultimate shareholder. p-values 
are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Industry dummies and market 
capitalization are included but not reported. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CloselyHeld Independence Governance Insider
Investor Protection 3.06 0.33 2.63 1.73
(0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth -2.09 -1.81 -1.73 -1.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection×Growth 0.44 0.05 -1.03 0.28
(0.00) (0.18) (0.03) (0.00)
Agency Cost -0.10 0.19 1.71 -3.56
(0.00) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
LowProtection×Agency Cost 0.02 0.09 3.44 1.97
(0.14) (0.45) (0.00) (0.23)
FinInstitutions 0.91
(0.77)
LowProtection×FinInstitutions -2.46
(0.51)
State -5.15
(0.42)
LowProtection×State 3.09
(0.64)
Ultimate 0.00
(0.86)
Constant 19.45 29.34 -14.83 24.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 52,249           52,261           10,364           57,830           
Number of Firms 16,249           13,281           4,763             16,031           
Wald Statistic 2,159             1,306             1,326             1,689             
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Table VI: Univariate Tests for Total Payouts 
 
Total payout is measured as dividends plus share repurchases divided by net income. High (low) investor protection is proxied 
by the Spamann’s corrected measure of antidirector rights index using the sample median as the cutoffHigh growth firms 
have a decile rank of industry-adjusted historical annual sales growth rates greater than 5. Firms are considered to have high 
agency costs if they have a value greater (or smaller, depending on the proxy of firm level agency cost) than the sample 
median for a given proxy of agency costs used. CloselyHeld is the fraction of shares that are closely held in a firm. 
Independence indicates the degree of independence of the firm from its shareholders. Governance is the firm’s corporate 
governance index constructed from ISS data. Insider takes the value of one for firms with insiders as the ultimate owner and 
zero otherwise. Median values are in italics. 
 
 
High vs. Low Growth
High 
Agency 
Cost
Low 
Agency 
Cost p-value
High 
Agency 
Cost
Low 
Agency 
Cost p-value
High 
Agency 
Cost
Low 
Agency 
Cost
CloselyHeld 38.6 42.1 0.00 30.8 35.3 0.00 0.00 0.00
28.3 30.8 0.00 21.6 26.2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Independence 35.8 38.2 0.01 30.8 28.6 0.00 0.00 0.00
25.6 27.1 0.00 21.9 18.8 0.05 0.00 0.00
Governance 44.6 45.4 0.72 38.8 42.9 0.10 0.03 0.25
34.2 35.9 0.44 26.8 35.6 0.00 0.01 0.60
Insider 32.8 37.4 0.01 26.1 28.7 0.02 0.00 0.00
24.4 26.8 0.00 18.2 18.9 0.01 0.00 0.00
CloselyHeld 36.2 43.0 0.00 29.6 32.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
23.8 32.4 0.00 19.2 16.7 0.97 0.00 0.00
Independence 37.9 42.9 0.00 31.8 31.6 0.71 0.00 0.00
27.3 32.4 0.00 22.9 18.5 0.00 0.00 0.00
Governance 35.2 53.5 0.00 25.1 43.7 0.00 0.00 0.00
18.2 45.0 0.00 4.7 31.9 0.00 0.00 0.00
Insider 34.3 40.1 0.00 27.6 30.6 0.00 0.00 0.00
20.2 28.8 0.00 17.4 17.1 0.18 0.00 0.00
Low Growth High Growth
High protection countries
Low protection countries
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Table VII: Interaction of Country and Firm Level Agency Costs and Investment Opportunities on 
Total Payouts 
 
This table shows the results for the cross-section of 43 countries for 2001-2006 from generalized least squares (GLS) random 
effects panel regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable (total payout) is dividends plus share repurchases 
divided by net income. Investor Protection is the Spamann’s corrected antidirector rights index. LowProtection takes a value of one 
if Spamann’s antidirector index<sample median, and zero otherwise. Growth is the decile rank of industry-adjusted historical 
annual sales growth rates. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is shown in the heading of columns (1)-(4). Companies have a 
low degree of independence from shareholders if Independence <8 and are considered to have high agency cost. For the remaining 
firm-level agency cost measures, “Low” and “High”, respectively, take a value of one for values lower or higher than the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. CloselyHeld is the fraction of shares closely held in a firm. Governance is the ISS corporate 
governance index. Insider, State and FinInstitutions, respectively, take the value of one for firms with insiders, states, or financial 
institutions as the ultimate owner, and zero otherwise. Ultimate is the percentage shareholding of the ultimate shareholder. p-values 
are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Industry dummies and market capitalization are 
included but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CloselyHeld Independence Governance Insider
LowProtection (β1) -1.58 -4.24 -2.94 -2.40
(0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
High Agency Cost (β2) 0.53 -9.37 -2.36 -9.53
(0.76) (0.00) (0.54) (0.01)
LowProtection × High Agency Cost (β3) -3.45 7.59 0.94 5.14
(0.09) (0.00) (0.82) (0.19)
Growth (γ1) -1.54 -2.20 -1.95 -1.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection × Growth (γ2) -0.37 0.45 0.33 0.22
(0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.16)
High Agency Cost × Growth (γ3) -0.24 1.37 0.76 0.95
(0.36) (0.00) (0.26) (0.04)
LowProtection × High Agency Cost × Growth (γ4) -0.56 -0.93 -1.23 -0.47
(0.07) (0.00) (0.09) (0.38)
Ultimate -0.01
(0.87)
State -1.56
(0.49)
FinInstitutions -0.38
(0.83)
Intercept (β0) 25.45 32.34 30.59 32.37
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 52,269            71,796            71,796            57,830            
Number of Firms 16,261            21,569            21,569            16,031            
Wald Statistic 1,839              2,230              2,233              1,600              
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Table VIII: Logistic Regressions for Payout Choice 
 
This table shows the random effects panel logit regression results for the cross-section of 43 countries for 2001-2006. The 
dependent variable takes a value of one for firms with an increase in dividends (as their sole method of payments) and zero for 
firms with share repurchases. Investor Protection is the Spamann’s corrected antidirector rights index. LowProtection takes a 
value of one if the Spamann’s measure<sample median, and zero otherwise. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is 
shown in the heading of columns (1)-(4). CloselyHeld is the percentage of shares that are closely held in a firm. Independence 
indicates the degree of independence of the firm from its shareholders. Governance is the firm’s corporate governance index 
constructed from ISS data. Insider, State and FinInstitutions respectively take the value of one for firms with insiders, states or 
financial institutions as the ultimate owner and zero otherwise. Ultimate is the percentage shareholding by the ultimate largest 
shareholder. Growth is the decile rank of industry-adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of annual income for the last 5 years divided by the average income. TaxAdvantage is dividend tax disadvantage. 
Options is a dummy variable indicating the presence of employee stock options. Country and industry dummies, and market 
capitalization are included in the regressions but not reported. The marginal effects, calculated at the mean value of the 
continuous variables, are reported in the table. p-values are in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CloselyHeld Independence Governance Insider
Investor Protection 0.83 1.22 0.05 0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.01)
Agency Cost -0.02 -0.38 -0.12 0.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.02)
LowProtection × Agency Cost 0.05 0.34 0.25 -0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46)
Ultimate 0.01
(0.04)
State 1.49
(0.16)
LowProtection × State -0.23
(0.84)
FinInstitutions -0.93
(0.17)
LowProtection × FinInstitutions 1.88
(0.01)
Growth 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.17
(0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00)
Volatility -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
TaxAdvantage 5.16 3.43 13.20 8.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Options -0.57 -0.58 -0.81 -0.81
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -9.71 -7.91 -12.09 -9.31
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Firms 27,927                  23,197                  7,129                    23,068                  
Number of Observations 9,501                    7,096                    3,178                    7,360                    
Wald Statistic 1,819                    1,407                    403                       1,099                    
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Table IX: Additional Robustness Tests for Total Payouts, Agency Conflicts and Investment 
Opportunities 
 
This table shows the results for the cross-section of 43 countries for 2001-2006 from generalized least squares (GLS) random 
effects panel regressions with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is total payouts (dividends plus share repurchases) 
divided by earnings in all regressions except for (2) where it is the industry-adjusted ratio of total payouts to earnings and for (6) 
where it takes a value of one for firms with an increase in dividends (as their sole method of payments) and zero for firms with 
share repurchases. Investor Protection is the Spamann’s measure of antidirector rights index. LowProtection takes a value of one if 
Spamann’s antidirector index<sample median, and zero otherwise. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is Independence 
except for (3) which uses a governance score based on the 44 factors from ISS. Companies have a low degree of independence 
from shareholders if Independence <8 and are considered to have high agency cost. For governance quality, “Low” and “High”, 
respectively, take a value of one for values lower or higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Growth is the decile rank 
of industry-adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. Volatility is the standard deviation of annual income for the last 5 years 
divided by the average income. TaxAdvantage is dividend tax disadvantage. Options is a dummy variable indicating the presence of 
employee stock options. In (4), standard errors are clustered at the firm value, and (5) reports results from tobit regression.  p-values 
are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Country and industry dummies and firm size are 
included but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without 
USA
Dependent:  
Industry-adjusted 
Payout/Earnings
Governance 
Quality:                 
44 factors
Standard Errors 
Clustered at        
Firm Level Tobit
Logit                                 
Without USA
LowProtection (β1) -4.02 -4.52 -2.70 -3.26 -12.64
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investor Protection 0.19
(0.07)
High Agency Cost (β2) -8.72 -8.14 1.08 -6.86 -16.25 -0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection × High Agency Cost (β3) 7.31 6.20 -4.90 5.29 15.02 0.25
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth (γ1) -2.10 -2.14 -1.94 -2.46 -2.89 0.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection × Growth (γ2) 0.83 0.35 0.28 0.33 0.45
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
High Agency Cost × Growth (γ3) 1.34 1.22 0.13 0.98 2.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00)
LowProtection × High Agency Cost × Growth (γ4) -1.27 -0.78 -0.50 -1.10
(0.00) (0.02) (0.15) (0.01)
Volatility -0.01
(0.00)
TaxAdvantage 1.84
(0.00)
Options -0.25
(0.03)
Intercept (β0) 38.39 8.99 30.55 31.33 20.15 -3.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Observations 54,594    71,796               71,796         71,796            71,796 17,846         
Number of Firms 15,816    21,569               21,569         21,569            21,569 5,676           
Wald (F) Statistic 1,075      2,535                 2,203           (205) 3,053   935              
